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CASE: I ARROW AND THE APPAREL INDUSTRY

Ten years ago, Arvind Clothing Ltd., a subsidiary of Arvind Brands Ltd., a member of the Ahmedabad based Lalbhai Group, signed up with the 150- year old Arrow Company, a division of Cluett Peabody & Co. Inc., US, for licensed manufacture of Arrow shirts in India. What this brought to India was not just another premium dress shirt brand but a new manufacturing philosophy to its garment industry which combined high productivity, stringent in-line quality control, and a conducive factory ambience.
Arrow’s first plant, with a 55,000 sq. ft. area and capacity to make 3,000 to 4,000 shirts a day, was established at Bangalore in 1993 with an investment of Rs 18 crore. The conditions inside—with good lighting on the workbenches, high ceilings, ample elbow room for each worker, and plenty of ventilation, were a decided contrast to the poky, crowded, and confined sweatshops characterising the usual Indian apparel factory in those days. It employed a computer system for translating the designed shirt’s dimensions to automatically mark the master pattern for initial cutting of the fabric layers. This was installed, not to save labour but to ensure cutting accuracy and low wastage of cloth.
The over two-dozen quality checkpoints during the conversion of fabric to finished shirt was unique to the industry. It is among the very few plants in the world that makes shirts with 2 ply 140s and 3 ply 100s cotton fabrics using 16 to 18 stitches per inch. In March 2003, the Bangalore plant could produce stain-repellant shirts based on nanotechnology.
The reputation of this plant has spread far and wide and now it is loaded mostly with export orders from renowned global brands such as GAP, Next, Espiri, and the like. Recently the plant was identified by Tommy Hilfiger to make its brand of shirts for the Indian market. As a result, Arvind Brands has had to take over four other factories in Bangalore on wet lease to make the Arrow brand of garments for the domestic market.
In fact, the demand pressure from global brands which want to outsource form Arvind Brands is so great that the company has had to set up another large factory for export jobs on the outskirts of Bangalore. The new unit of 75,000 sq. ft. has cost Rs 16 crore and can turn out 8,000 to 9,000 shirts per day. The technical collaborators are the renowned C&F Italia of Italy.
Among the cutting edge technologies deployed here are a Gerber make CNC fabric cutting machine, automatic collar and cuff stitching machines, pneumatic holding for tasks like shoulder joining, threat trimming and bottom hemming, a special machine to attach and edge stitch the back yoke, foam finishers which use air and steam to remove creases in the finished garment, and many others. The stitching machines in this plant can deliver up to 25 stitches per inch. A continuous monitoring of the production process in the entire factory is done through a computerised apparel production management system, which is hooked to every machine. Because of the use of such technology, this plant will need only 800 persons for a capacity which is three times that of the first plant which employs 580 persons.
Exports of garments made for global brands fetched Arvind Brands over Rs 60 crore in 2002, and this can double in the next few years, when the new factory goes on full stream. In fact, with the lifting of the country-wise quota regime in 2005, there will be surge in demand for high quality garments from India and Arvind is already considering setting up two more such high tech export-oriented factories.
It is not just in the area of manufacture but also retailing that the Arrow brand brought a wind of change on the Indian scene. Prior to its coming, the usual Indian shirt shop used to be a clutter of racks with little by way of display. What Arvind Brands did was to set up exclusive showrooms for Arrow shirts in which the functional was combined with aesthetic. Stuffed racks and clutter eschewed. The product were displayed in such a manner the customer could spot their qualities from a distance. Of course, today this has become standard practice with many other brands in the country, but Arrow showed the way. Arrow today has the largest network of 64 exclusive outlets across India. It is also present in 30 retail chains. It branched into multi-brand outlets in 2001, and is present in over 200 select outlets.
From just formal dress shirts in the beginning, the product range of Arvind Brands has expanded in the last ten years to include casual shirts, T-shirts, and trousers. In the pipeline are light jackets and jeans engineered for the middle-aged paunch. Arrow also tied up with the renowned Italian designer, Renato Grande, who has worked with names like Versace and Marlboro, to design its Spring / Summer Collection 2003. The company has also announced its intention to license the Arrow brand for other lifestyle accessories like footwear, watches, undergarments, fragrances, and leather goods. According to Darshan Mehta, President, Arvind Brands Ltd., the current turnover at retail prices of the Arrow brand in India is about Rs 85 crore. He expects the turnover to cross Rs 100 crore in the next few years, of which about 15 per cent will be from the licensed non-clothing products.
In 2005, Arvind Brands launched a major retail initiative for all its brands. Arvind Brands licensed brands (Arrow, Lee and Wrangler) had grown at a healthy 35 per cent rate in 2004 and the company planned to sustain the growth by increasing their retail presence. Arvind Brands also widened the geographical presence of its home-grown brands, such as Newport and Ruf-n Tuf, targeting small towns across India. The company planned to increase the number of outlets where its domestic brands would be available, and draw in new customers for readymades. To improve its presence in the high-end market, the firm started negotiating with an international brand and is likely to launch the brand.
The company has plans to expand its retail presence of Newport Jeans, from 1200 outlets across 480 towns to 3000 outlets covering 800 towns.
For a company ranked as one of the world’s largest manufactures of denim cloth and owners of world famous brands, the future looks bright and certain for Arvind Brands Ltd.

Company profile

Name of the Company : Arvind Mills
Year of Establishment : 1931
Promoters : Three brothers–Katurbhai, Narottam Bhai, and Chimnabhai
Divisions : Arvind Mills was split in 1993 into
Units—textiles, telecom and garments. Arvind Ltd. (textile unit) is 100 per cent subsidiary of Arvind Mills.
Growth Strategy : Arvind Mills has grown through buying-up of sick units, going global and acquisition of German and US brand names.

Questions

1. Why did Arvind Mills choose globalization as the major route to achieve growth when the domestic market was huge?

2. How does lifting of ‘Country-wise quota regime’ help Arvind Mills?

3. What lessons can other Indian businesses learn form the experience of Arvind Mills?

Case 1
HOW GENERAL MOTORS IS COLLABORATING ONLINE

The Problem
Designing a car is a complex and lengthy task. Take, for example, General Motors (GM). Each model created needs to go through a frontal crash test. So the company builds prototypes that cost about one million dollars for each car and tests how they react to frontal crash. GM crashes these cars, makes improvements, then makes new prototypes and crashes them again. There are other tests and more crashes. Even as late as the 1990s, GM crashed as many as 70 cars for each new model.

The information regarding a new design and its various tests, collected in these crashes and other tests, has to be shared among close to 20,000 designers and engineers in hundreds of divisions and departments at 14 GM design labs, some of which are located in different countries. In addition, communication and collaboration is needed with design engineers of the more than 1,000 key suppliers. All of these necessary communications slowed the design process and increased its cost. It took over four years to get a new model to the market.

The Solution
GM, like its competitors, has been transforming itself into an e-business. This gradual transformation has been going on since the mid-1990s, when Internet band width increased sufficiently to allow Web collaboration. The first task was to examine over 7,000 existing legacy IT systems, reducing them to about 3,000, and making them Web-enabled. The EC system is centered on a computer-aided design (CAD) program from EDS (a large IT company, subsidiary of GM). This system, known as Unigraphics, allows 3-D design documents to be shared online by both the internal and external designers and engineers, all of whom are hooked up with the EDS software. In addition. Collaborative and Web-conferencing software tools, including Microsoft’s NetMeeting and EDS’s eVis, were added to enhance teamwork. These tools have radically changed the vehicle-review process.
To see how GM now collaborates with a supplier, take as an example a needed cost reduction of a new seat frame made by Johnson Control GM electronically sends its specifications for the seat to the vendor’s product data system. Johnson Control’s collaboration systems (eMatrix) is integrated with EDS’s In graphics. This integration allows joint searching, designing. Tooling, and testing of the seat frame in real time, expediting the process and cutting costs by more than 10 percent.
Another area of collaboration is that of crashing cars. Here designers need close collaboration with the test engineers. Using simulation, mathematical modeling, and a Web-based review process. GM is able now to electronically “Crash” cars rather than to do it physically.

The Results
Now it takes less than 18 months to bring a new car to market, compared to 4 or more years before, and at a much lower design cost. For example, 60 cars are now “Crashed” electronically, and only 10 are crashed physically. The shorter cycle time enables more new car models, providing GM with a competitive edge. All this has translated into profit. Despite the economic show down. GM’s revenues increased more than 6 percent in 2002. while its earnings in the second quarter of 2002 doubled that of 2001.

Questions:

1. Why did it take GM over four years to design a new car?
2. Who collaborated with whom to reduce the time-to-market?
3. How has IT helped to cut the time-to-market?

CASE – 1 Dabur India Limited: Growing Big and Global

Dabur is among the top five FMCG companies in India and is positioned successfully on the specialist herbal platform. Dabur has proven its expertise in the fields of health care, personal care, homecare and foods.
The company was founded by Dr. S. K. Burman in 1884 as small pharmacy in Calcutta (now Kolkata), India. And is now led by his great grandson Vivek C. Burman, who is the Chairman of Dabur India Limited and the senior most representative of the Burman family in the company. The company headquarters are in Ghaziabad, India, near the Indian capital New Delhi, where it is registered. The company has over 12 manufacturing units in India and abroad. The international facilities are located in Nepal, Dubai, Bangladesh, Egypt and Nigeria.
S.K. Burman, the founder of Dabur, was trained as a physician. His mission was to provide effective and affordable cure for ordinary people in far-flung villages. Soon, he started preparing natural remedies based on Ayurved for diseases such as Cholera, Plague and Malaria. Due to his cheap and effective remedies, he became to be known as ‘Daktar’ (Indianised version of ‘doctor’). And that is how his venture Dabur got its name—derived from Daktar Burman.
The company faces stiff competition from many multi national and domestic companies. In the Branded and Packaged Food and Beverages segment major companies that are active include Hindustan Lever, Nestle, Cadbury and Dabur. In case of Ayurvedic medicines and products, the major competitors are Baidyanath, Vicco, Jhandu, Himani and other pharmaceutical companies.

Vision, Mission and Objectives

Vision statement of Dabur says that the company is “dedicated to the health and well being of every household”. The objective is to “significantly accelerate profitable growth by providing comfort to others”. For achieving this objective Dabur aims to:
• Focus on growing core brands across categories, reaching out to new geographies, within and outside India, and improve operational efficiencies by leveraging technology.
• Be the preferred company to meet the health and personal grooming needs of target consumers with safe, efficacious, natural solutions by synthesising deep knowledge of ayurveda and herbs with modern science.
• Be a professionally managed employer of choice, attracting, developing and retaining quality personnel.
• Be responsible citizens with a commitment to environmental protection.
• Provide superior returns, relative to our peer group, to our shareholders.

Chairman of the company

Vivek C. Burman joined Dabur in 1954 after completing his graduation in Business Administration from the USA. In 1986 he was appointed Managing Director of Dabur and in 1998 he took over as Chairman of the Company.
Under Vivek Burman’s leadership, Dabur has grown and evolved as a multi-crore business house with a diverse product portfolio and a marketing network that traverses the whole of India and more than 50 countries across the world. As a strong and positive leader, Vivek C. Burman has motivated employees of Dabur to “do better than their best”—a credo that gives Dabur its status as India’s most trusted nature-based products company.

Leading brands

More than 300 diverse products in the FMCG, Healthcare and Ayurveda segments are in the product line of Dabur. List of products of the company include very successful brands like Vatika, Anmol, Hajmola, Dabur Amla Chyawanprash, Dabur Honey and Lal Dant Manjan with turnover of Rs.100 crores each.
Strategic positioning of Dabur Honey as food product, lead to market leadership with over 40% market share in branded honey market; Dabur Chyawanprash is the largest selling Ayurvedic medicine with over 65% market share. Dabur is a leader in herbal digestives with 90% market share. Hajmola tablets are in command with 75% market share of digestive tablets category. Dabur Lal Tail tops baby massage oil market with 35% of total share.
CHD (Consumer Health Division), dealing with classical Ayurvedic medicines has more than 250 products sold through prescription as well as over the counter. Proprietary Ayurvedic medicines developed by Dabur include Nature Care Isabgol, Madhuvaani and Trifgol.
However, some of the subsidiary units of Dabur have proved to be low margin business; like Dabur Finance Limited. The international units are also operating on low profit margin. The company also produces several “me – too” products. At the same time the company is very popular in the rural segment.

Questions

1. What is the objective of Dabur? Is it profit maximisation or growth maximisation? Discuss.
2. Do you think the growth of Dabur from a small pharmacy to a large multinational company is an indicator of the advantages of joint stock company against proprietorship form? Elaborate.

Note: Solve any 4 Cases Study’s

CASE: I Playing to a new beat: marketing in the music industry

Good old fashioned rock ‘n’ roll could be dead. If a mobile phone ringtone in the shape of the vocalizations of the animated Crazy Frog dominates the billboard charts for months on end, then it could well signal the death knell for the industry, and how it operates. If this ubiquitous amphibian’s aurally annoying song, converted from a mobile phone ringtone, outsold even mainstay acts such as Oasis and Coldplay, why should music companies invest millions in cultivating fresh musical talent, hoping for them to be the next big thing, when their efforts can be beaten by basic synthesizer music? The industry is facing a number of challenges that it has to address, such as strong competition, piracy, changing delivery formats, increasing cost pressures, demanding pri-madonnas and changing customer needs. Gone are the days when music moguls were reliant on sales from albums alone, now the industry trawls for revenue from a variety of sources, such as ringtones, merchandising, concerts, and music DVDs, leveraging extensive back catalogues, and music rights from advertising, movies and TV programming.

The music industry is in a state of flux at the moment. The cornerstone of the industry—the singles chart—has been facing terminal decline since the mid-1990s. Some retailers are now not even stocking singles due to this marked freefall. Some industry commentators blame the Internet as the sole cause, while others point to value differences between the price of an album and the price of a single as too much. Likewise, some commentators criticize the heavy pre-release promotion of new songs, the targeting of ever-younger markets by pop acts, and the explosion of digital television music channels as root causes of the single’s demise. The day when the typical record buyer browses through rows of shelves for a much sought-after band or song on a Saturday afternoon may be thing of the past.

Long-term success stories for the music industry are increasingly difficult to develop. The old tradition of A&R (which stands for ‘Artists & Repertoire’) was to sign, nurture and develop musical talent over a period of years. The industry relied on continually feeding the system with fresh talent that could prove to be the next big thing and capture the public imagination. Now corporate short-term thinking has enveloped business strategies. If an act fails to be an immediate hit, the record label drops them. The industry is now characterized by an endless succession of one-hit wonders and videogenic artist churning out classic cover songs, before vanishing off the celebrity radar. Four large music labels now dominate the industry (see Table 1), and have emerged through years of consolidation.

Table 1 The ‘big four’ music labels

Universal Music Sony BMG
The largest music label, with 26 per cent of global music market share; artists on its roster include U2, Limp Bizkit, Mariah Carey and No Doubt Merger consolidated its position; artists on its roster include Michael Jackson, Lauryn Hill, Westlife, Dido, Outkast and Christina Aguilera
Warner Music EMI
Third biggest music group; artists on its roster include Madonna, Red Hot Chili Peppers and REM Artists on its roster include the Rolling Stones, Coldplay, Norah Jones, Radiohead, and Robbie Williams

The ‘big four’ labels have the marketing clout and resources to invest heavily in their acts, providing them with expensive videos, publicity tours and PR coverage. This clout allows their acts to get vital airplay and video rotation on dedicated TV music channels. Major record labels have been accused of offering cash inducements of gifts to radio stations and DJs in an effort to get their songs on playlists. This activity is known in the industry as ‘radio payola’.

Consumer have flocked to the Internet, to download, to stream, to ‘rip and burn’ copyrighted music material. The digital music revolution has changed the way people listen, use and obtain their favourite music. The very business model that has worked for decades, buying a single or album from a high-street store, may not survive. Music executives are left questioning whether the Internet will kill the music business model has been fundamentally altered. According to the British Phonographic Industry (BPI), it estimated that 8 million people in the UK are downloading music from the Internet—92 per cent of them doing so illegally. In 2005 alone, sales of CD singles fell by a colossal 23 per cent. To put the change into context, the sales of digital singles increased by 746.6 per cent in 2005. Consumers are buying their music through different channels and also listening to their favourate songs through digital media rather than through standard CD, cassette or vinyl. The emergence of MP3 players, particularly the immensely popular Apple iPod, has transformed the music landscape even further. Consumers are now downloading songs electronically from the Internet, and storing them on these digital devices or burning them onto rewritable CDs.

Glossary of online music jargon

Streaming: Allows the user to listen to or watch a file as it is being simultaneously downloaded. Radio channels utilize this technology to transmit their programming on the Internet.

‘Rip n burn’: Means downloading a song or audio file from the Internet and then burning them onto rewritable CDs or DVD.

MP3 format: MP3 is a popular digital music file format. The sound quality is similar to that of a CD. The format reduces the size of a song to one-tenth of its original size allowing for it to be transmitted quickly over computer networks.

Apple iPod: The ‘digital jukebox’ that has transformed the fortunes of the pioneer PC maker. By the end of 2004 Apple is expected to have sold 5 million units of this ultra-hip gadget. It was the ‘must-have item’ for 2003. The standard 20 GB iPod player can hold around 5000 songs. Other hardware companies, such as Dell & Creative Labs, have launched competing devices. These competing brands can retail for less than £75.

Peer-to-peer networks (P2P): These networks allow users to share their music libraries with other net users. There is no central server, rather individual computers on the Internet communicating with one another. A P2P program allows users to search for material, such as music files, on other computers. The program lets users find their desired music files through the use of a central computer server. The system works lime this; a user sends in a request for a song; the system checks where on the Internet that song is located; that song is downloaded directly onto the computer of the user who made the request. The P2P server never actually holds the physical music files—it just facilitates the process.

The Internet offers a number of benefits to music shoppers, such as instant delivery, access to huge music catalogues and provision of other rich multi-media material like concerts or videos, access to samples of tracks, cheaper pricing (buying songs for 99p rather than an expensive single) and, above all, convenience. On the positive side, labels now have access to a wider global audience, possibilities of new revenue streams and leveraging their vast back catalogues. It has diminished the bargaining power of large retailers, it is a cheaper distribution medium than traditional forms and labels can now create value-laden multimedia material for consumers. However, the biggest problem is that of piracy and copyright theft. Millions of songs are being downloaded from the Internet illegally with no payment to the copyright holder. The Internet allows surfers to download songs using a format called ‘MP3’, which doesn’t have inbuilt copyright protection, thus allowing the user to copy and share with other surfers with ease. Peer to peer (P2P) networks such as Kazaa and Grokster have emerged and pose an even deadlier threat to the music industry—they are enemies that are even harder to track and contain. Consumers can easily source and download illegal copyrighted material with considerable ease using P2P networks (see accompanying box).

P2P Networks used for file sharing

Kazaa
Gnutella
Grokster
Morpheus
eDonkey
Imesh
Bearshare
WinMX

A large number of legal download sites have now been launched, where surfers can either stream their favourite music or download it for future use in their digital libraries. This has been due to the rapid success of small digital medial players such the Apple iPod. The legal downloading of songs has grown exponentially. A la carte download services and subscription-based services are the two main business models. Independent research reveals that the Apple’s iTunes service has over 70 per cent of the market. Highlighting this growing phenomenon of the Internet as an official channel of distribution, new music charts are now being created, such as the ‘Official Download Chart’. Industry sources suggest that out of a typical 99p download, the music label get 65p, while credit card companies get 4p, leaving the online music store with 30p per song download. These services may fundamentally eradicate the concept of an album, with customers selecting only a handful of their favourite songs rather than entire standard 12 tracks. These prices are having knock-on consequences for the pricing of physical formats. Consumers are now looking for a more value-laden music product rather than simply 12 songs with an album cover. Now they are expecting behind the scenes access to their favourite group, live concert footage and other content-rich material.

Big Noise Music is an example of one of the legitimate downloading sites running the OD2 system. The site is different in that for every £1 download, 10p of the revenue goes to the charity Oxfam.

The music industry is ferociously fighting back by issuing lawsuits for breach of copyright to people who are illegally downloading songs from the Internet using P2P software. The recording industry has started to sue thousands of people who illegally share music using P2P. They are issuing warnings to net surfers who are P2P software that their activities are being watched and monitored. Instant Internet messages are being sent to those who are suspected of offering songs illegally. In addition, they have been awarded court orders so that Internet providers must identify people who are heavily involved in such activity. The music industry is also involved heavily in issue advertising campaigns, by promoting anti-piracy websites such as www.pro-music.org to educate people on the industry and the impact of piracy on artists. These types of public awareness campaigns are designed to illustrate the implications of illegal downloading.

Small independent music labels view P2P networks differently, seeing them as vital in achieving publicity and distribution for their acts. These firms simply do not have the promotional resources or distribution clout of the ‘big four’ record labels. They see P2P networks as an excellent viral marketing tool, creating buzz about a song or artist that will ultimately lead to wider mainstream and commercial appeal. The Internet is used to create communities of fans who are interested in their music, providing them access to free videos and other material. It allows independent acts the opportunity to distribute their music to a wider audience, building up their fan base through word of mouth. Savvy unsigned bands have sophisticated websites showcasing their work, and offering free downloads as well as opportunities for audio-philes to purchase their tunes. Alternatively major labels still see that to gain success one has to get a video on rotation on MTV and that this in turn encourages greater airplay on radio stations, ultimately leading to increased purchases.

Table 2 The major legitimate online music provider
Name Details Pricing
Apple iTunes Huge catalogue of over 750,000 songs; compatible with Apple’s very hip iPod system; offers free single of the week and other exclusive material 79p per track, £7.99 per album
Napster The now-legitimate website offers over 1,000,000 songs; offers several streaming radio stations too Subscription based—subscribers pay £9.99 a month to stream any of the catalogue, plus another 99p to download on to a CD
Sony Connect over 300,000 songs from the major labels; excellent sound quality but compatible only with Sony products due to proprietary file formats From 80p- £1.20 per track, and £8- £10 per album
Bleep.com Small catalogue of 15,000 songs with a focus on independent music labels; high-quality downloads due to media files used 99p per track, £6.99 per album
Wippit UK-based service; 175,000 songs to download; gives a selection of free tracks every month From 30p to £1 to download; alternatively, users can subscribe to the service for £50 a year to gain access to 60,000 songs
OD2 System, used by:Mycokemusic.com HMV.com
MSN.com
TowerRecord.co.uk
Big Noise Music These online sites use the OD2 system for music downloads; they look after encryption, hosting, royalty management and the entire e-commerce system; provides access to nearly 350,000 tracks from 12,000 recording artists Varying product bundles, typically 99p for track download, and 1p for streaming
For traditional music retailers the retailing landscape is getting more competitive, with multiple channels of distribution emerging due to the Internet and large supermarket chains now selling music CDs. Supermarkets are becoming one of the main channels of distribution through which consumers buy music. These supermarkets are stocking only a limited number of the best-selling music titles, limiting the number of distribution outlets for new and independent music. Only charts hits and greatest hits collections will make it on to the shelves of such outlets.

Now consumers can buy albums from traditional Internet retailers such as Amazon.com, and also on websites that utilize access to grey markets such as cdwow.co.uk, as well as through legitimate download retailers. This has left traditional music retail operations with a severe conundrum: how can they entice more shoppers into their stores? The accompanying box highlights where typical shoppers source their music at present.

Where do people buy their music?

Music stores (like HMV, Virgin Megastore) 16 per cent
Chains (like Woolworth, WHSmith) 16 per cent
Supermarkets (like Tesco, Asda) 21.6 per cent
Mail order 3.9 per cent
Internet sales (like Amazon.com) 7 per cent
Downloads Not yet measured

The issue of online music retailers using parallel importing, such as CDWOW (www.cdwow.co.uk) is a concern. These retailers are taking advantage of worldwide price discrepancies for legitimate music CDs, sourcing them in low-cost countries like Hong Kong and exporting them into European countries. Prices for music in these markets are considerably lower than the market that they are exporting to, and they don’t even charge for international delivery. Yet technological improvements have led to revenue opportunities for the industry. Development such as online radio, digital rights management, Internet streaming, tethered downloads (locked to PC), downloads (burnable, portable), in-store kiosks, ring-tones, mobile message clips and games soundtracks are great potential revenue sources. In an effort to unlock this potential the major labels have digitized their entire back catalogues. In the wake of these dramatic environmental changes the industry has had to radically adapt. The ‘big four’ music labels are consolidating even further, developing a digital music strategy, and re-evaluating their entire traditional business model. Mobile phones are seen as the next primary channel of distribution for digital music. High penetration levels in the market for mobile phones and the inherent mobility advantages make this the next crucial battlefield for the music industry.

The Internet may emerge as the primary channel of distribution for music, and the music industry is going to have to adapt to these changes. The move towards the online distribution of entertainment is still in its infancy, with more investment into the telecommunications infrastructure, such as greater Internet access, increased access to broadband technology, 3G technology and changing the way people shop for music will undoubtedly take time. The digital revolution will fundamentally change the way people purchase and consume their musical preferences. In forthcoming years the digital format will become more mainstream, leading to a proliferation of channels of distribution for music. However, as with most new channels of technology, catalogue shopping, Internet shopping likewise, and ‘video never really killed the radio star’… but will the Internet kill the record store?

Questions:

1. Discuss the micro and macro forces that are affecting the music industry.

2. Based on this analysis, what strategic options would you recommend for both music publishers and music retailers in the current marketing environment?

3. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages associated with online distribution from a music label’s perspective.

Note: Solve any 4 Cases Study’s

CASE: I Managing the Guinness brand in the face of consumers’ changing tastes

1997 saw the US$19 billion merger of Guinness and GrandMet to form Diageo, the world’s largest drinks company. Guinness was the group’s top-selling beverage after Smirnoff vodka, and the group’s third most profitable brand, with an estimated global value of US$1.2 billion. More than 10 million glasses of the popular stout were sold every day, predominantly in Guinness’s top markets: respectively, the UK, Ireland, Nigeria, the USA and Cameroon.

However, the famous dark stout with the white, creamy head was causing some strategic concerns for Diageo. In 1999, for the first time in the 241-year of Guinness, sales fell. In early 2002 Diageo CEO Paul Walsh announced to the group’s concerned shareholders that global volume growth of Guinness was down 4 per cent in the last six months of 2001 and, more alarmingly, sales were also down 4 per cent in its home market, Ireland. How should Diageo address falling sales in the centuries-old brand shrouded in Irish mystique and tradition?

The changing face of the Irish beer market

The Irish were very fond of beer and even fonder of Guinness. With close to 200 litres per capita drunk each year—the equivalent of one pint per person per day—Ireland ranked top in worldwide per capita beer consumption, ahead of the Czech Republic and Germany.

Beer accounted for two-thirds of all alcohol bought in Ireland in 2001. Stout led the way in volume sales and accounted for 40 per cent of all beer value sales. Guinness, first brewed in 1759 in Dublin by Arthur Guinness, enjoyed legendary status in Ireland, a national symbol as respected as the green, white and gold flag. It was by far the most popular alcoholic drink in Ireland, accounting for nearly one of every two pints of beer sold. Its nearest competitors were Budweiser and Heineken, which held 13 per cent and 12 per cent of the market respectively.

However, the spectacular economic growth of the Irish economy since the mid-1990s had opened up the traditional drinking market to new cultures and influences, and encouraged the travel-friendly Irish to try other drinks. Beer and in particular stout were losing popularity compared with wine or the recently launched RTDs (ready-to-drinks) or FABs (flavoured alcoholic beverages), which the younger generation of drinkers considered trendier and ‘healthier’. As a Euromonitor report explained: Younger consumers consider dark beers and stout to be old fashioned drinks, with the perceived stout or ale drinker being an old, slightly overweight man and thus not in tune with image conscious youth culture.

Beer sales, which once accounted for 75 per cent of all alcohol bought in Ireland, were expected to drop to close to 50 per cent by 2006, while stout sales were forecast to decrease by 12 per cent between 2002 and 2006.

Giving Guinness a boost in its home market

With Guinness alone accounting for 37 per cent of Diageo’s volume in the market, Guinness/UDV Ireland was one of the first to feel the pain caused by the declining popularity of beer and in particular stout. A Euromonitor report in February 2002 explained how the profile of the Guinness drinker, typically men aged 21-plus, was affected: The average age of Guinness drinkers is rising and this is bringing about the worrying fact that the size of the Guinness target audience is falling. The rate of decline is likely to quicken as the number of less brand loyal, non-stout drinking younger consumers increases.
The report continued:
In Ireland, in particular, the consumer base for Guinness is shrinking as the majority of 18 to 24 year olds consistently reject stout as a product relevant to their generation, opting instead to consume lager or spirits.
Effectively, one-third of young Irish men and half of young Irish women had reportedly never tried Guinness. A Guinness employee provided another explanation. Guinness is similar to coffee in that when you’re young you drink it [coffee] with sugar, but when you’re older you drink it without. It’s got a similar acquired taste and once you’re over the initial hurdle, you’ll fall in love with it.
In an attempt to lure young drinkers to the somewhat ‘acquired’ Guinness taste (40 per cent of the Irish population was under the age of 24) Diageo had invested millions in developing product innovations and brand building in Ireland’s 10,000 pubs, clubs and supermarkets.

Product innovation

Until the mid-1990s most Guinness in Ireland was drunk in a pint glass in the local pub. The launch of product innovations in the form of a new cooling mechanism for draft Guinness and the ‘widget’ technology applied to cans and bottles attempted to modernize the brand’s image and respond to increasing competition from other local and imported stouts and lagers.

‘A perfect head’ for canned Guinness
In 1989, and at a cost of more than £10 million, Guinness developed an ingenious ‘widget’ device for its canned draft stout sold in ‘off-trade’ outlets such as supermarkets and off-licences. The widget, placed in the bottom of the can, released a gas that replicated the draft effect.
Although over 90 per cent of beer in Ireland was sold in ‘on-trade’ pubs and bars, sale of beer in the cheaper ‘off-trade’ channel were slowly gaining in importance. The Guinness brand manager at the time, John O’Keeffe, explained how home drinkers could now enjoy a smoother, creamier head similar to the one obtained in a pub thanks to the new widget technology:
When the can is opened, the pressure causes the nitrogen to be released as the widget moves through the beer, creating the classic draft Guinness surge.

Nearly 10 years later, in 1997, the ‘floating widget’ was introduced, which improved the effectiveness of the device.

A colder pint
In 1997 Guinness Draft Extra Cold was launched in Ireland. An additional chilled tap system could be added to the standard barrel in pubs, allowing the Guinness to be served at 4ºC rather than the normal 6ºC. By serving Guinness at a cooler temperature, Guinness/UDV hoped to mute the bitter taste of the stout and make it more palatable for younger adults, who were increasingly accustomed to drinking chilled lager, particularly in the summer

A cooler image for Guinness
In October 1999 the widget technology was applied to long-stemmed bottles of Guinness. The launch was supported by a US$2 million TV and outdoor board campaign. The packaging—with a clear, shiny plastic wrap, designed to look like a pint complete with creamy head—was quite a departure from the traditional Guinness look.

The objective was to reposition Guinness alongside certain similarly packaged lagers and RTDs and offer younger adults a more fashionable way to drink Guinness: straight from the bottle. It also gave Guinness easier access to the growing number of clubs and bars that were less likely to serve traditional draft Guinness easier access to the growing number of clubs and bars that were less likely to serve traditional draft Guinness, which could be kept for only six to eight weeks and took two minutes to pour. The RTDs, by contrast, had a shelf-life of more than a year and were drunk straight from the bottle.

However, financial analyst remained sceptical about the Guinness product innovations, which had no significant positive impact on sales or profitability:

The last news about the success of the recently introduced innovations suggests that they have not had a notably material impact on Guinness brand performance.

Brand building

Euromonitor estimates that, in 2000, Diageo invested between US$230 and US$250 million worldwide in Guinness advertising and promotions. However, with a cost-cutting objective, the company reduced marketing expenses in both Ireland and the UK up to 10 per cent in 2001 and the number of global Guinness agencies from six to two.

Nevertheless, Guinness remained one of the most advertised brands in Ireland. It was the leading cinema advertiser and, in terms of advertising, was second only to the national telecoms provider, Eircom. Guinness was also heavily promoted at leading sporting and music events, in particular those that were popular with the younger age groups.

The ultimate tribute to the brand was the opening of the new Guinness Storehouse in Dublin in late 2000, a sort of Mecca for all Guinness fans. The Storehouse was also a fashionable visitor centre with an art gallery and restaurants, and regularly hosted evening events. The company’s design brief highlighted another key objective:
To use an ultramodern facility to breathe life into an ageing brand, to reconnect an old company with young (sceptical) customers.
As the Storehouse’s design firm’s director, Ralph Ardill, explained:

Guinness Storehouse had become the top tourist destination in Ireland, attracting more than half a million people and hosting 45,000 people for special events and training.
The Storehouse also had training facilities for Guinness’s bartenders and 3000 Irish employees. The quality of the Guinness pint remained a high priority for the company, which not only developed pub-like classrooms at the Storehouse but also employed teams of draft technicians to teach barmen how to pour a proper pint. The process involved two steps—the pour and the top-up—and took a total of 119.5 seconds. Barmen also needed to learn how to check that the pressure gauges were properly set and that the proportion of nitrogen to carbon dioxide in the gas was correct.

The uncertain future of the Guinness brand in Ireland

Despite Guinness/DUV’s attempt to appeal to the younger generation of drinkers and boost its fading image, rumours persisted in Ireland about the brand future. The country’s leading and respected newspaper, the Irish times, reported in an article in July 2001:
The uncertainty over its future all adds to the air of crisis that is building around Guinness Ireland Group four months ago…The review is not complete and the assumption is that there is more bad news to come.
In the pubs across Ireland, the traditional Guinness drinkers looked on anxiously as the younger generation drank Bacardi Breezers, Smirnoff Ices or Californian wines. Could the goliath Guinness survive another two centuries? Was the preference for these new drinks just a fad or fashion, or did Diageo need to seriously reconsider how it marketed Guinness?

A quick solution?

In late February 2002, Diageo CEO Paul Walsh revealed that the company was testing technology to cut the waiting time for a pint of Guinness from 1 minute 59 seconds to 15-25 seconds. Ultrasound could release bubbles in the stout and form the head instantly, making a pint of Guinness that would be indistinguishable from one produced by the slower, traditional method.
‘A two-minute pour is not relevant to our customers today,’ Walsh said. A Guinness spokeswoman continued, ‘We have got to move with the times and the brand must evolve. We must take all the opportunities that we can. In outlets where it is really busy, if you walk in after nine o’clock in the evening there will be a cloth over the Guinness pump because it takes longer to pour than other drinks. Aware that some consumers might not be attracted by the innovation, she added ‘It wouldn’t be put everywhere—only where people want a quick pint with no effect on the quality.’

Although still being tested, the ‘quick-pour pint’ was a popular topic of conversation in Dublin pubs, among barmen and customers alike. There were rumours that it would be introduced in Britain only; others thought it would be released worldwide.

Some market commentators viewed the quick-pour pint as an innovative way to appeal to the younger, less patient segment in which Guinness had under-performed. Others feared that the young would be unconvinced by the introduction, and loyal customers would be turned off by what they characterized as a ‘marketing u-turn’.

Question:

1. From a marketing perspective, what has Guinness done to ensure its longevity?

2. How would you characterize the Guinness brand?

3. What could Guinness do to attract younger drinkers? And to retain its older loyal customer base? Can both be done at the same time?

Case 1:
Scripto, Inc. (B)1

At one time, Scripto, Inc., utilized the services of Audits and Surveys, a national marketing research firm, but, owing to budgetary restraints, Scripto eliminated marketing research and channeled its financial resources in other directions. As a result, the company had little of the data it required for important marketing decisions. For example, the company experienced great difficulty in securing comparative data for sales of its products and competitive products in retails outlets.
Determined not to let the void of data affect the 19¢er, Scripto management decided again to consider using marketing research. While management was in general agreement that marketing research was an essential ingredient in marketing orientation and sales strategy, there were two viewpoints as to the type of marketing research needed. One group believed that market studies and data were most crucial to the success of the ¢er; hence, they favored using the services of marketing-research companies, such as Audits and Surveys or A.C. Nielsen Company. Both Audits and Surveys and Nielsen prepared bimonthly reports measuring sales and movements of products through stores (the former was used by Papermate). The major differences between the two research companies were (1) cost and (2) type of retail outlet sampled. It would cost Scripto $20,000 to use Audits and Surveys and $25,000 to use Nielsen. Audits and Surveys recorded sales and products movement primarily of mass merchandisers (variety stores) and a relatively small sample of drugstores and grocery stores, while Nielsen sampled more drugstores and grocery stores than A and S but a smaller sample of variety stores.
Another group, however, preferred a different course of action – the use of a marketing research firm that specialized in consumer buying patterns rather than market studies per se. This group contended that consumer research was more instrumental in the future of the 19¢er. Such research was typified by the data generated by the National Consumer Panel of Market Research Corporation of America.
Decisions were required on (1) whether or not to again use marketing research; (2) if so, the type of marketing research most important for Scripto’s 19¢er, market studies and/or consumer buying patterns; and (3) the relationship between sales and marketing research. Management was especially concerned about the relationship between sales and marketing research.

Case 1 Questions:

What is your position on the three problems that had to be solved by Scripto? Defend your arguments.